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Notes
INSURANCE: FALSE ANSWERS IN AN APPLICATION
I. INTRODUCrON
When the eagerness of a careless or unethical insurance agent to
sell an insurance policy coincides with the natural propensity of the
average man to assume that the agent will properly record his
answers to questions, legal difficulties frequently occur. Many cases
have arisen in Kentucky and other jurisdictions in which an applicant
has truthfully given an agent information which would decrease his
chances of obtaining insurance coverage, or make coverage more ex-
pensive; and, the agent, desiring to sell a policy and receive his com-
mission, has inserted false answers which would aid the applicant in
acquiring insurance protection.1 A related legal problem arises when
an agent fills in answers on the application form without posing the
questions to the insured.
The courts of this country have taken conflicting positions in
determining whether the insured may recover on the policy in such
situations. After a series of recent decisions favoring insurance com-
panies, the Kentucky Court of Appeals substantially changed its posi-
tion in a case decided in March of 1969, in which the majority
opinion stated the Court would no longer place the full responsibility
on the applicant to see that the application was correctly filled out.
2
Many courts and legal writers state that the majority rule is that if an
applicant gives truthful answers to questions contained in the ap-
plication, but the agent of the insurer falsely records them, the in-
surer cannot rely on the falsity of the answers to avoid liability on the
policy.3 Yet, there is said to be a majority rule,4 or trend toward a
rule,5 that the insured has a duty to read or to have read to him the
insurance application. Therefore, he is presumed to have knowledge
1 The reader may gain some idea of the surprising frequency with which this
problem arises in the courts by glancing at the citations listed in 45 C.J.S.
Insurance §§ 729, 782 and 783 (1946).2 Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. v. McReynolds, No. 69-188 (Ky. Court of
Appeals, March 28, 1969).
3 Harris v. Guaranty Income Life Ins. Co., 226 La. 152, 75 So.2d 227 (1954);
Theros v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 17 Utah 2d 205, 407 P.2d 685 (1965); 17 J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 9401 (1945); S. WImisToN, CON-
TRAaTs § 751 (3d ed. 1961); 29A AM. Jur. INSURANCE § 1060 (1960).
4 Theros v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 17 Utah 2d 205,-, 407 P.2d 685, 688
(1965); 17 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, at 9405.
5 Kentucky Cent. Life Ins..Co. v. Combs, 432 S.W.2d 415 (1968); W. VANCE,
HANDBOOK ON TE LAW OF INSURANCE § 44 (1951).
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of its contents and is bound by the information given in the applica-
tion even though it may contain false answers which were inserted by
the agent.
One court, when confronted with conflicting decisions, declared
that this area of the law was in a state of "utter confusion" and that.
the cases could not be "reconciled on any reasonable basis."6 While
this writer does not succumb to such a pessimistic viewpoint, it is
true that there are conflicting decisions concerning the insertion of
false answers in an application by an insurance agent. This confusion
may be explained in part by the difficulty in deciding which of the two
innocent parties must bear the loss. The applicant, wanting insurance
coverage, has approached the transaction in good faith by truthfully
answering all the questions asked by the agent. He has paid his
premiums regularly and has relied upon the belief that he was
adequately insured. Now, the anticipated casualty having occurred, he
or his beneficiaries expect to collect on the policy. The insurer is also
an innocent party to the transaction. If he had known the true in-
formation concerning the circumstances involved, he would never have
issued the policy or accepted the premiums paid by the insured; or, at
least, would have demanded a higher price for coverage. Now he is
being asked to pay on a risk he did not intend to take-a result of the
dishonesty or negligence of one of his employees. No matter how the
case is decided, an innocent party will lose, and the court may un-
consciously be influenced by sympathy for one party or the other.
Another reason for the variation in results is the presence of con-
flicting legal principles and policy considerations in this area of the
law. In the first section of this note, principles of agency, contracts, and
the law of evidence will be discussed because each has great influence
on the decisions reached in these cases.
In later sections, special policy provisions, statutes affecting in-
surance applications, and circumstances surrounding execution and
possession of the application will be considered. The author will
explore the development of Kentucky law, and discuss the implica-
tions of recent decisions.
II. BAsic LEGAL TBxoms INVOLVED
A. Agency Law
It is a basic principle of agency law that the actions and knowledge
of an agent are imputed to his principal. 7 An insurer is charged by
6 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Alterovitz, 214 Ind. 186, 14 N.E.2d 570 (1938).
7 17 J. APPr.s--,m", supra note 3, at 9401, n. 2; 44 CJ.S. Insurance § 139, at
798 (1948).
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some courts with knowledge of the falsity of the answers in an ap-
plication since its agents knew that the answers were untrue. There-
fore, it cannot rely on the falsity of the statements to avoid liability on
the policy.8 Courts taking this position feel that it is the responsibility
of the insurance company to select competent, trustworthy agents in
order to protect itself from unintended risks. As the New Jersey court
stated in Heake v. Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company, "Since
[the insurer] has placed the agent in a position to do such acts it
must be answerable for the manner in which the agent has conducted
himself in doing business on behalf of the principal."9
Other courts take the position that the insurance agent, when in-
serting the false answers in the application, is not acting for his
principal. It is said that when an agent of an insurer intentionally in-
serts false statements in a policy, though he is apparently acting for
his principal, he is, in reality, acting for himself and against the
principal. 10 His act is part of a fraudulent scheme he has devised for
his own benefit and is therefore outside of the scope of his agency.'
Arguments have been made that an agent of an insurer becomes the
agent of the applicant while filling out an application thereby making
the applicant, rather than the insurer, responsible for the misrepre-
sentations. This argument has had little success.'
2
B. Contract Law
It is a basic principle of contract that, in the absence of fraud or
mistake, a party is bound by the terms of a contract which he accepts,
and he will not be allowed to deny knowledge of its terms in an
action upon the instrument.'8
Ignorance through negligence or inexcusable trustfulness will not re-
lieve a party from his contract obligations. He who signs or accepts a
written contract in the absence of fraud or other wrongful act on the
part of another contracting party, is conclusively presumed to know its
contents and assent to them .... 14
This rule originated during a period in which contracts were the
result of negotiation and bargaining between the parties. Today, courts
who wish to avoid the conclusion that the insured is bound by the
8 Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 17 Utah 2d 205, 407 P.2d 685 (1965).
9 15 N.J. 475, -, 105 A.2d 526, 530 (1954).
10 29A Am. JuR. supra note 3, at 229.
11 Anderson v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 141 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied 323 U.S. 798 (1945); Wichita Falls Protective Assn v. Lewis, 52 S.W.2d
134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
12 29A Am. Jum. supra note 3, at 229.
13 American Fidelity Co. v. Mahoney, 174 A.2d 446,449 (Me. 1961); Bearden
v. Countryside Cas. Co., 352 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Mo. 1961).
14 Metzger v. Aetna Ins. Co., 227 N.Y. 411, 416, 125 N.E. 814, 816 (1920).
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false answers inserted in the policy by the agent and by provisions
voiding the policy in case of material misrepresentations try to assert
that the insurance policy is a special type of contract to which the
general rules of contract law should not be applied.15 Insurance poli-
cies are standardized forms prepared by the insurance company. The
individual applicant, therefore, has no opportunity to negotiate with
the insurance company regarding the terms which will or will not be
included in his policy. The company, using its own legal experience
and the legal experience of other insurance companies, has drafted a
contract which it feels to be most advantageous to its own interests.
Among its objectives in drawing up such a form are saving the time
and trouble of bargaining and simplifying administration. The finished
form, which has been drafted by lawyers and/or semantic experts is
duplicated many times and the copies are distributed to the agents of
the company who offer to sell insurance coverage to the public. The
prospective purchaser of the insurance knows that his only choice is to
accept the entire policy form as it has been printed by the company,
or to be without coverage. Of course, he may purchase a policy from
another insurance carrier, but he will confront the same problem of
the standardized contract form.
Standardized contracts, unilaterally prepared, have been termed
"adhesion contracts" because one party draws up the instrument and
other party has the sole option of adhering to it.16 Adhesion contracts,
though they can occur where the parties have approximately equal
bargaining power, are usually found where one party has a stronger
bargaining position than the other. In such a situation, the party in
the stronger bargaining position will frequently be more familiar with
the terms of the contract than the weaker party. The insurer who
usually has had adequate time during the drafting period to examine
the provisions of the policy and to have them interpreted by its legal
counsel, is obviously more familiar with the terms of the instrument
than the purchaser of insurance. If the purchaser takes the time to
examine his policy, he may find himself confused by the technical
phraseology and the many conditions and stipulations contained
therein.
17
It has been said that people buy insurance as if it were a com-
15 W. VANCE, supra note 5, §44, at 258-59.
16 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract,
43 CoLum. L. REv. 629 (1943); Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance
Policy, 33 HAuv. L. REv. 198 (1919); Note, The Adhesion Contract of Insurance,
5 SANTA CiARA LAwYE:R 60 (1964).
17 For a discussion of the ambiguity of language in insurance contracts, see
Mooney, Functional Analysis of Exceptions in Accident Insurance, 1964 U. hI.L. L
FoRum 495.
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modity'8 and, therefore, do not think to examine the policy carefully.
Not only do the illiterate and poorly-educated fail to read the policies,
but even persons of average intelligence and business sense rely upon
the good faith of the agent.
Many courts feel that the preceding arguments do not furnish
sufficient reason for treating insurance contracts differently than other
types of contracts. 9 These courts believe that one who has had the
opportunity to read his insurance policy and does not do so is fore-
closed by his own negligence.20 This position will be discussed later.
C. The Law of Evidence
It is a fundamental rule of evidence that parol testimony will not
be admitted to vary or alter the terms of a written contract.21 Using
this principle, many courts have refused to permit the insured to
testify that he gave answers to the insurance agent which were dif-
ferent from those shown in the policy application.22 Some of the
reasons why this rule should be followed are found in the early case
of New York Life Insurance Co. v. Fletcher:
It would introduce great uncertainty in all business transactions,
if a party making written proposals for a contract, with representations
to induce its execution, should be allowed to show, after it had been
obtained, that he did not know the contents of his proposals, and to en-
force it, notwithstanding their falsity as to matters essential to its
obligation and validity. Contracts could not be made, or business
fairly conducted, if such a rule should prevail; and there is no reason
why it should be applied merely to contracts of insurance. There is
nothing in their nature which distinguishes them in this particular
from others 23
However, many courts admit parol evidence. Professor Vance's
Handbook on the Law of Insurance describes the two theories under
which parol evidence is admitted. A few courts admit evidence that
the misrepresentations were due to the fraud or mistake of the in-
18 Longo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. App.
1940), modified sub noam. state ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes,
152 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1941).
19 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Alterovitz, 214 Ind. 186, 14 N.E.2d 570
(1938); Gillan v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy, 143 Neb. 647, 10 N.W.2d 693(1943).
20 Dickinson v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 283 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App. 1955).
21W. VANCE, supra note 5, § 44, at 261-62.
22New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U.S. 519 (1886); Norwick Union
Indem. Co. v. H. Kobacker & Sons, 31 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1929); Gillan v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 143 Neb. 647, 10 N.W.2d 693 (1943).
23 117 U.S. 519, 529 (1886). The court suggests that the offeror in the
insurance contract situation is the applicant. Is this realistic in an adhesion contract
negotiation?
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surer's agent on the ground that such statement was not in fact the
statement of the insured even though he may have signed the appli-
cation and accepted the policy. Many courts admit parol evidence in
support of an estoppel alleged by the insured to prevent the insurer
from taking advantage of a defense due to his own wrong.
24
III. Estoppel and Waiver
It is said to be the majority rule that an insurer cannot avoid
liability on an insurance policy because of material misrepresentations
in the application where the false statements were entered by the
agent without the fraud, collusion, or actual or constructive knowledge
of the insured.25 If the insurer does attempt to avoid liability by al-
leging that the untrue statements prevent recovery on the policy,
there are two defenses which may be used against him. One of these
is the defense of waiver, which may be defined as a relinquishment of
some right or privilege or of the opportunity to take advantage of
some defect or wrong.26 The court may hold that the agent's know-
ledge of the falsity of the answers is imputed to the insurer and that
the insurer, by later issuing the policy and accepting the premiums
paid by the insured, is deemed to have waived the right to rely on the
misstatement in the application.
2'
The second and, perhaps, the most frequently used defense is the
principle of equitable estoppel. Estoppel may be distinguished from
waiver by the fact that waiver is a relinquishment of a right and
estoppel is the inhibition to assert it.28 An estoppel arises where a
litigant is precluded from alleging or denying a certain fact or set of
facts because of his own acts or admissions.29 In the insurance cases
being discussed, the acts giving rise to the estoppel are those of the
insurer's agent, which are imputed to his principal. To permit the in-
surer to avoid liability on the policy, it is argued, would be to permit
him to profit by his own wrong. The insurer, therefore, is estopped
from asserting the defense of material misrepresentation.8"
24 W. VANcE, supra note 5, § 44, at 261-62.
25 Hooker v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 33 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Ky. 1940);
Boggio v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 597, 239 P.2d 144
(1952); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 217 Ga. 206, 121 S.E.2d 649 (1961).2 0 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1751 (4th ed. 1957).
2 7 Templeton v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 235 Mo. App. 424, 140 S.W.2d 726
(1940); 29A Am. Jun., supra note 3, at 228.28 Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202,-, 198 A.419, 427-28 (1938).
29 BLACes LAw DICTIONARY 648 (4th ed. 1957).
30 Boggio v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 597, 239
P.2d 144 (1952).
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IV. DuTy To BEAD
It is the majority rule that the insured has a duty to read, or to
have read to him, the insurance application; and, therefore, he is
charged with knowledge of its contents.2 1 This rule has been applied in
cases in which the applicant was unable to read or write the English
language 32 and in cases where he was an illiterate.
3
Many courts, however, are more lenient in these situations, and
have not found it inexcusably negligent for such a person to fail to
read his policy.
34
Several decisions imposing a duty to read insurance policies are
based on fact situations in which the insured received a copy of the
policy and the application from the insurance company and held them
in his possession.35 In a recent Louisiana case3 6 where the decedent
had had the insurance policy in his possession for about two months,
the court felt it necesary to charge him with constructive knowledge
of the falsity of answers contained therein. The duty to read, which
is placed upon the insured upon receipt of his policy, was described
by a Missouri appellate court as follows:
... (I)t is not enough that the applicant for insurance shall have
merely made truthful answers to the questions put to him in his ap-
plication; . . . the element of continued good faith enters into all such
transactions; . . . upon the delivery of the policy, the insured must
exercise reasonable diligence to discover the contents of the contract,
and to advise the insurer of the falsity of any of the representations con-
stituting material inducements for the insurance of the policy.. .37
If the insured has had a reasonable opportunity to discover mis-
representations and does not inform the insurer of the false statements,
31 Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Combs, 432 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1968);
Theros v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 17 Utah 2d 205, 407 P.2d 685 (1965); W. VANcE,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INsURANcE § 44 (1951).
32 Russo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 125 Conn. 132, 3 A.2d 844 (1949);
Prevete v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 343 Pa. 365, 22 A.2d 691 (1941); 45 C.J.S.
Insurance § 742, at 732 (1946); 17 Am. Jur. 2D Contracts § 149, at 497 (1964).3 3 Curry v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 809, 194 S.E. 825 (1937);
Boucouvalas v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 N.H. 175, 5 A.2d 721 (1939).3 4 Charlton v. Wakemoto, 70 Idaho 276, 216 P.2d 370 (1950); 45 CJ.S.
Insurance § 782, at 743 (1946); Note, Can A Beneficiary Collect on an Insurance
Policy after Agent Places False Answer in Application? 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 506
(1962).
85 Stugest v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,' 170 So.2d 903 (La. 1965); Longo v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. App. 1940), modified
sub norn. State ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 152 S.W.2d.
132 (Mo. 1941); Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 17 Utah 2d 205, 407 P.2d
685 (1965).3 6 Stugest v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 So.2d 903 (La. 1965).
87 Longo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 S.W.2d 871, 876 (Mo.
App. 1940), modified sub non. State ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Hughes, 152 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1941).
[Vol. 57,
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his silence will be deemed to be ratification of the statements in his
application.38 This rule was applied in a 1962 Oregon case8 9 in which
the insurance policy with the attached application was not delivered
until after the injury occurred and the insured attempted to collect. The
plaintiff contended that the defendant's delay in forwarding the
policy made it impossible for him to discover the false assertions in
the application prior to his injury. He did not, however, assert that
he did not read the policy and application after having received them
from the defendant; nor did he make any showing that he was unable
to do so. The court held that the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity
to discover the misrepresentations and that his silence constituted
ratification of the statements contained in the application. The policy
and application had been mailed to the plaintiff a month before he had
filed his claim. The court stressed the fact that the words "Please Read
Your Policy" were printed in large capital letters on the face of the
policy, and that the photostatic copy delivered to the plaintiff was
printed in contrasting black and white and was bound to attract at-
tention.
In jurisdictions in which there has been held to be a duty to read
the application, resulting in the insured being bound by statements
contained therein, the standard has been relaxed in particular situa-
tions. An exception is described in Heake v. Atlantic Casualty In-
surance Company, a 1954 New Jersey case:
In New Jersey, the general rule is that the insured is bound by the
terms of the policy that he has received and had an opportunity to read,
and reformation will be denied if he has been negligent in failing to ap-
prise himself of its contents.... Yet it is also quite dear that where the
insurer has been guilty of fraud or other unconscionable conduct, it can-
not successfully plead that if the insured had exercised reasonable care
he would not have been defrauded. 40
The court in Heake then discussed the youth of the insured and his
reliance upon the agent.
The standard may be relaxed in situations where the insured was
misled by statements of the agent. In a California case, the court
acknowledged that "when the insured has a copy of the application in
his possession he is presumed to have read it and to be aware of any
misstatements therein, even though they were not due to his own
fault . . ."41 but stated the rule would not apply where the insured
3s Martin v. Oregon Ins. Co., 232 Ore. 197, 375 P.2d 75 (1962).
8 Id.40 teake v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 15 N.J. 475,-, 105 A.2d 526, 530 (1954).
41 Boggio v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 597,-,
239 P.2d 144, 146 (1952).
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could not have ascertained that his answers were false in the sense that
they withheld required information. In that case, the insured had
relied on the agent's interpretation of a question in the policy to the
effect that it was not necessary to inform the insurance company of
an injury received in the Armed Services where that injury did not
lead to a medical discharge. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company v. Schwarzer,42 a 1968 case from Massachusetts, involved a
situation in which the insured was misled by statements of the agent
The applicant had told the insurance agent about her illnesses and
hospitalization. The agent said that he would inform the insurance
company of this, and if there was any question, he would notify the
applicant. The court stated that his delivery of the policy "was an
implied representation that he had reported to the company and
that the information given by her was not material to defeat issuance
of the policy."43 It noted that in most jurisdictions, the principle that
the acceptance of a contract establishes all of its terms is applied to
insurance policies. However, this court felt that the particular conduct
giving rise to an equitable estoppel might be such as to excuse the
reading of the policy; and if so, the acceptance of the policy with the
attached application would not bind the insured to the false statements
contained therein.44 In this case, the court thought that even if the in-
sured had read the application, she would not have believed any mis-
representation was being made to the company because of the state-
ment of the agent.
Of course, the insured cannot recover on the policy in any
jurisdiction where he colludes with the insurance agent to defraud the
insurer by inserting false answers in the application.45 Bad faith short
of collusion also defeats recovery on the policy. In Temperance In-
surance Exchange v. Coburn,46 the insured asserted that he had in-
formed the insurer's agent honestly concerning the matters in question,
but admitted that he had watched the agent fill out the application and
knew that she had written false answers. The court held that where an
applicant knows that the agent is not copying true answers to the
questions on an application for insurance, the insurer is entitled to a
cancellation of the policy. It has been held that where the conduct of
an agent raises a clear presumption that he would not communicate a
42237 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 1968).
43 Id. at 53.
44 Id.
45 Ketcham v. American Mut. Accident Ass'n, 117 Mich. 521, 76 N.W. 5
1898); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Templeton, 50 Tenn. App. 615, 362 S.W.2d 938
1962)846 85 Idaho 468, 379 P.2d 653 (1963).
[Vol. 57,
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certain fact, the principal will not be bound by the knowledge of his
agent.47 It would seem reasonable to say that in such instances, a duty
arises in the applicant to convey the information to the insurance
company. The Temperance Insurance Exchange case and cases similar
to it carry this principle over into the law of insurance.
V. SPECIAL POLICY POVISIONS
Using legal experience gained from past cases in the insurance field,
insurance companies have devised various provisions which can be
drafted into policy forms in an attempt to avoid liability in the case
of fraud or mistake on the part of the agent in filling out the applica-
tion. To avoid the general rule that the knowledge of an agent,
acquired within the scope of his duties of employment as to facts
material to insurance coverage, is imputed to the company, many
policies include such stipulations as a provision that knowledge of the
agent shall not be held to effect a waiver of any part of the contract,
or that no statements made to, or information acquired by, an agent
shall bind the insurer unless stated in the application. 48 There is sub-
stantial authority that the insurer may, through such limitations on the
authority of its agents of which the insured has notice, avoid liability
on the policy where untrue answers are placed in the application by
its agent without knowledge of the insured.49 At least one jurisdiction
has held, however, that a limitation of authority contained in an in-
surance policy will not operate retroactively to apply to conduct sur-
rounding the application. 0 Still other jurisdictions have held that such
limitations on the scope of agency do not preclude the raising of an
estoppel against the insurer to assert the defense of misrepresentation. 51
Another provision frequently used in life insurance policies is that
the policy shall not take effect unless the insured is in good health at
the time of delivery.5 2 Where such a provision is used and the agent
answers questions in such a way as to misrepresent the state of health
of the applicant, the insurer is still protected against having to pay
on a bad health risk he did not intend to take (assuming, of course,
that there are no additional facts which would constitute a waiver of
the provision by the company).
47 Hooker v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 33 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Ky. 1940).48 See 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 692, at 648 (1946).
49 See 29A Am. Jur. Insurance § 1064 (1960).50 Saunders v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 Ohio St. 55, 151 N.E.2d 1 (1958).
51 Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 101 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Ark. 1937); 29A AM.
Jun. Insurance § 1064 (1960).
52 National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Roberson, 180 Okla. 265, 68 P.2d 796
(1937).
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VI. STATUTORY PIOVISIONS
Some states have enacted provisions to the effect that the persons
soliciting insurance and procuring the application will be considered
to be the agent of the company issuing the policy. Such statutes have
been used to justify a judgment for the insured; 53 but this has not
always been the result.
54
Statutes have been enacted in many states55 providing that the in-
surance application shall be attached to the policy and embodied into
the contract. It has been argued that such statutes are enacted for the
benefit of the insured, to give him the opportunity to read his ap-
plication and discover any errors made by the agent in filling in the
blanks, but in actual operation, the statute is advantageous to the in-
surer.56 The effect of these statutes on the insurance law is clearly
explained by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Schwarzer:
. . . [Tihe majority view is that the insured is bound by mis-
statements appearing in an application attached to the policy delivered
to and retained by him. . . . The rule has been applied in jurisdictions
which apply or had applied the equitable estoppel doctrine.....
The rigorous application of this rule [which I would presume would
result from enactment of a statute requiring the application to be at-
tached to the policy and embodied in it] in effect wipes out the equitable
estoppel doctrine.57
The court mentioned that Indiana, Nebraska, New York and Oregon
had applied the estoppel doctrine prior to the adoption of statutes
embodying the application in the policy. Though the legislature of its
own state had enacted such a statute, the court stated that notwith-
standing the general contract rule, it was of the opinion that under
Massachusetts law the particular conduct giving rise to the estoppel
might be such as to excuse the reading of the policy.5
Kentucky, a jurisdiction in which the equitable estoppel doctrine
has been applied, enacted a statute embodying the insurance ap-
plication into the policy and containing the following requirements:
All policies issued by a company to persons within this state, which
policies contain any reference to the application of the insured or the by-
laws or rules of the company, either as forming part of the policy or
contract between the parties thereto or as having any bearing on the
53 Saunders v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 Ohio St. 55, 151 N.E.2d 1 (1958).
54 Perkins v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 100 N.H. 383, 128 A.2d 207
(1956).
55 E.g., Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, New York, Ohio and Oregon.56 Note, Insurance: N.Y. Insurance Law § 58; Effect of Insured's Failure to
Read Application, 16 Coiumm-r. L.Q.2523(11)
57 237 N.E.2d 50, 52 (Mass. 1968). 
.(1931).
58 The facts in the Schwarzer case are discussed supra in section IV of the text
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contract, shall have the application, bylaws and rules or the parts thereof
relied upon as forming part of the policy or contract, or as having any
bearing on the contract, attached to the policy or printed on the face or
reverse side thereof. Unless either so attached and accompanying the
policy, or printed on the face or reverse side thereof, the same shall
not be received as evidence in any action for the recovery of benefits
provided by the policy, and shall not be considered a part of the policy
or of the contract between the parties .... 59
Many Kentucky cases decided after enactment of the statute have
held the purchaser of insurance to a strict duty to read his policy, re-
sulting in a greater number of judgments for the insurer. These cases
will be discussed in a later section of this note.
VII. THE DEvELoPmaT oF KENTUCKY LAW
The insured frequently won in the early Kentucky cases, but a
subsequent line of decisions imposing a duty upon the insured to read
his policy reflected a trend favorable to insurance companies.60 This
trend continued until the recent decision in Pennsylvania Life In-
surance Company v. McReynolds6 ' in which the Court declined to
place the full responsibility upon the insured to see that the application
is correctly filled out. By looking at the Kentucky cases in chronological
order, we can see the changes taking place.
A. Early Kentucky Law-Estoppel & Waiver
In the late nineteenth century, Kentucky began applying the
principle of equitable estoppel to insurance companies. In Western As-
surance Company v. Rector,62 an 1885 case, the court formulated the
following rule:
In all cases where the agent filling out the application is clothed with
real or apparent authority to make a contract of insurance, and knows
the facts, the company is estopped from darning that it has been misled
by omissions or misstatements. If the applicant acts in good faith, re-
lying on this apparent authority, and makes true answers to all questions
asked, and the agent, without his knowledge or consent, through mis-
take or ignorance, writes answers deemed by him the equivalent of so
much of the answers actually given as he considers necessary to be
written, a recovery can not be prevented by reason of the fact that the
agent failed to write all of the ansvers actually given, or wrote that
which was not the equivalent of the answer so given, though the answer
as written was not true in fact .... 63
59 Ky. 1Ev. STAT. § 299.130 (1962).
60 Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Combs, 432 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1968); Mills
v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 335 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1960); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v.
Thomas, 310 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. 1958).61 No. 69-188 (Ky. Court of Appeals, Mar. 28, 1969).
627 Ky. L. Rptr. 523 (1885).
3Id. at 523.
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In this case, the agent had misled the insured by stating that gun-
powder was included in the term "general merchandise" used in the
application to describe the storeowner's stock of goods. If the in-
sured had read the policy, however, he would have discovered his
duty to obtain the consent of the insurance company before acquiring
a policy on a store which carried gunpowder as an item of mer-
chandise.64
The principles enunciated in Western Assurance were upheld in
an 1887 case 5 in which the agent, upon being told by the insured that
he intended to replace a stovepipe, which ran up through a drum
fixed in the roof, with a brick chimney, wrote in the application that
the stovepipe ran into a chimney. The Court held that where an ap-
plicant answers honestly and truthfully all questions asked him, he
may rely on the insurance agent who is writing the application to re-
cord them correctly. If the agent does fill in false answers without the
knowledge of the applicant, the applicant will not be prevented from
recovering on the policy on the grounds that misrepresentations have
been made in the application.
In a 1914 case,66 the plaintiff attempted to recover on his insurance
policy after he was accidentally injured by falling from a passenger
coach. The agent who had sold the policy testified that he had
written the answers in the application literally as given to him by the
insured, while the insured testified that he had informed the agent of
certain injuries and treatments received prior to the accident which
were not revealed in the application. The Court, in upholding a
judgment for the insured, stated that the equitable estoppel doctrine
was followed in Kentucky. Under the fact situation in this case, it was
for the jury to determine whether the insured had answered questions
truthfully and completely and whether, without fraud or bad faith on
his part, the agent of the insurer wrote answers in the application
which he knew were false or so incomplete or so worded as to create
a false impression.
To counteract the effect of these unfavorable decisions, insurance
companies began drafting into their policies the provision that notice
to or knowledge of the agent would not preclude assertion by the in-
surer of any defense. In Sun Indemnity Company of New York v.
Hulcer,67 such a provision was held ineffectual to prevent the in-
sured from recovering on a policy containing false answers or errors
64 Id. at 524.65 Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. McNulty, 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 876 (1887).66 General Accident Life & Fire Assur. Corp. v. Richardson, 157 Ky. 503,
163 S.W. 482 (1914).
67251 Ky. 484, 65 S.W.2d 471 (1938).
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inserted in the application by the agent where the insured had no
knowledge of the limitation. In Standard Auto Insurance Association
v. Russell,8 the Court cited the rule that if the agent writes false
answers to questions propounded to the applicant or, by misleading
statements, induces the applicant to make false answers when the ap-
plicant is acting in good faith, the insurer is estopped from avoiding
liability on the policy because of such false statements. The Court
went on to state that the insurer could not avoid enforcement of the
rule by provisions in the policy to the effect that the agent acts as
agent for the insured while filling out the application or that the in-
surer shall not be liable for the acts of its agents.
In Western and Southern Life Insurance Company v. VanHoosds
Administratrix,9 the Court held that where an agent fills in answers
in an application without asking the questions, and the answers are
false, the company is estopped from asserting their falsity as a de-
fense. A judgment was rendered for the insurer, however, on the issue
of waiver of the sound health provision of the policy. The insured had
been in the last stages of tuberculosis before application for the
policy was made, and the Court held that such facts precluded a
claim of waiver of that provision. It was not proved that the agent
had knowledge of the bad health of the insured. Neither, however, was
it proved that the agent would not have learned of the bad health of
the applicant had he so inquired.
A similar case was decided in 1945.70 The agent of the company
testified that he knew the insured had received treatment for a back
injury a few weeks previous to the application for insurance. He asked
the insured if there was any good reason why he could not get the in-
surance and then proceeded to answer all the questions in the ap-
plication himself. The question: "What illnesses, disease or injuires has
Life Proposed had in the past three years?" was answered "None."
Questions as to whether insured had ever undergone hospital treatment
or suffered a serious injury were also answered negatively. Citing
National Life Company v. Rigney,71 the Court stated that the insurer
could not rely upon misrepresentation because the knowledge of the
agent was imputed to the company. However, since it was not shown
that the insurer knew that the applicant was suffering with pernicious
anemia at the time of delivery of the policy, the insurer could not be
deemed to have waived the sound health provision of the policy.72
68 199 Ky. 470, 251 S.W. 628 (1923).
69 283 Ky. 577, 142 S.W.2d 145 (1940).
70 Wester & S. Le Ins. Co. v. Downs, 301 Ky. 322, 191 S.W.2d 576 (1945).
71297 Ky. 743, 180 S.W.2d 847 (1944).
72 322 Ky. at 326, 191 S.W.2d at 578.
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B. The Middle Period-
Duty to Read
One of the earliest cases involving a duty to read was Kentucky
Central Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Lynn.7 In this case,
the father of an eighteen-year old diabetic had applied for life in-
surance on his son. There was conflicting evidence concerning the issue
of responsibility for false statements in the application. The application
contained representations that the insured had never had diabetes, and
that he had had no illnesses or diseases in the past three years. The
Court was of the opinion that had this been the only defense the
question should have been submitted to a jury. But the company also
relied on provisions (1) allowing avoidance where the insured had
been treated for a disease during a two-year period before issuance of
the policy and (2) stating that no person had authority to waive or
change any part of the policy except by an endorsement signed by the
president or secretary of the insurer.7 4 The Court, in holding that a
verdict for the insurer should have been directed, mentioned that the
insured was "an intelligent young man, able to read and write and
understand."75 The Court felt that the insured had an obligation to
read his policy at the time it was delivered to him, "and then, if dis-
satisfied with his contract as written, to have raised a righteous row in
protest."76 The Court suggested that he then could have refused to
accept the policy or pay the premium. (The Lynn case was later over-
ruled to the extent that it may have implied that where the limitation
on the agent's authority appeared for the first time in the policy, the
insured would be bound retroactively from the date the application
was signed.) 77
In Commonwealth Life Insurance Company v. Keen,78 a man ap-
plied for life insurance for his seventeen-year old son who suffered
from rheumantic heart disease. The boy had been hospitalized and one
of his attending physicians had stated that there was no hope of
ultimate recovery. The father testified that he had told the insurance
agent that his son had had rheumatic fever, but that it was his belief
that he was much improved since his release from the hospital. He
said the agent had not asked the questions but inserted answers him-
self. The insured argued that the company was estopped from relying
73 304 Ky. 416, 200 S.W.29d 946 (1947).
74 Id. at 418, 200 S.W.2d at 947.
75 Id. at 421, 200 S.W.2d at 948.
76 Id.
77 Employers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 253 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky.
1952).
78313 Ky. 301, 231 S.W.2d 78 (1950).
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on the misrepresentation to avoid liability on the policy because the
false answers had been inserted by its own agent. The insured also
maintained that the agent had waived provisions in both the policy
and the application regarding the falsity or truth of answers by writing
in answers without questioning the applicant or his father.79 Pro-
visions had been drafted into the policy to the effect that knowledge
acquired by the insurance agent would not bind the company unless it
was set out in writing in the application or in the report of the medical
examiner, and that the policy would not take effect unless and until it
was delivered, provided the insured was in good health on that date. 0
The Court felt that "any applicant for insurance especially one who
has taken out policies on four members of his family has, or should
have, some reasonable knowledge of the nature and purpose of
questions in an application."81 After hearing the statement which had
been made by the boy's physician, the Court could not believe that
the father was ignorant of his son's condition. In the light of the mis-
leading statements and the fact that the insured was not in good
health upon the delivery of the policy, the Court held that the insurer
was entitled to a pre-emptory instruction.
8 2
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Tannenbaum, 3 there
was no question of a limitation on an agent's authority prior to is-
suance of the policy. The limitation was set forth in the application
which provided that no statement made to or knowledge on the part of
"any agent, medical examiner or any other person as to facts per-
taining to the applicant shall be considered as having been made or
brought to the knowledge of the company unless stated in either Part
A or Part B of this application."8 4 Citing Connecticut Fire Insurance
Company of America v. Robertss5 and several other Kentucky cases,
the Court held that where limitations on soliciting agents' authority
are contained in the application, the insured is charged with notice
thereof, and the insurer will not be bound by an act of waiver by the
agent which conceals information material to the risk. It was the
opinion of a majority of the Court that it was error to submit the case
to a jury.80
The dissent criticized the line of decisions which began with the
Roberts case, and urged the Court to return to the principles of the
79 Id. at 302-03, 231 S.W.2d at 78.
so Id. at 303, 231 S.W.2d at 78-79.
81 Id. at 304, 231 S.W.2d at 79.
82 Id.
83 240 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. 1951).
84 Id. at 570.
852 26 Ky. 534, 11 S.W.2d 148 (1928).
86 240 S.W.2d at 570.
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Russell87 case which had refused to give effect to a limitation on the
authority of an agent.
8 8
In Reserve Life Insurance Company v. Thomas, 9 a copy of the
application was attached to the policy-a procedure required by
statute0 before statements in the application can be received as
evidence in an action for recovery of benefits or before the application
will be considered a part of the contract between the parties. The ap-
plication contained no notice to the insured concerning any limitations
on the agent's authority but notified him that no insurance was ef-
fective until a policy was actually issued by the company. The policy
itself contained a provision that the company's agents did not have
authority to waive policy provisions without approval of the home
office. The Court stated that the misrepresentations were made at the
inception of the insurance contract and that parol evidence should be
admitted to show the surrounding circumstances. Although the Court
reversed a judgment for the insured, it refused to lay down any hard
and fast rule on the duty to read one's policy.9 1
Unlike Tannenbaum, the Thomas decision apparently was not
based on provisions limiting the authority of the agent. The rationale
for the decision was stated as follows:
However, in the case at bar, the evidence discloses that the repre-
sentations in the application were so palpably false that recovery on the
policy should not be permitted regardless of who was responsible for
insertion of the false answers. For this reason, the judgment is re-
versed.92
The Court noted that it had recently placed more responsibility
on an applicant for insurance "to see to it that his representations
to the company approach the truth."9 3
Two years later, in Mills v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, 4
the Court took a clear and unambiguous stand. Though the insured in
that case was an illiterate, the court nevertheless held him to a duty
to read his insurance application. "A handicap which makes it more
difficult for one to fulfill a duty, does not have the effect of excusing
the duty."9 5 The majority stated that that he had an obligation to
procure someone to read and explain it to him before he signed it,
87 Standard Auto Ins. Ass'n v. Russell, 199 Ky. 470, 251 S.W. 628 (1923).
88 240 S.W.2d at 571.
89 310 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. 1958).
90Ky. REv. STAT. § 299.130 (1962).
91310 S.W.2d at 269.
92 Id. at 270.
93 Id.
94 335 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1960).
95 Id. at 957.
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and failure to do so was so grossly negligent as to raise an estoppel
against him. The dissenting opinion expressed the viewpoint that it
is reasonable to expect an insurance purchaser to read his application
only if he is literate. The Tannenbaum case and the majority opinion
in Mills were criticized as unjust results.9
The Court again confronted the problem of the illiterate applicant
in the recent case of Kentucky Central Life Insurance Company V.
Combs,97 wherein it was stated flatly that when the falsity of the
representation is established and its materiality is not disputed, there
can be no recovery-despite the illiteracy of the applicant.98 The posi-
tion of the majority was strongly criticized in a dissenting opinion
which cited the Russell"9 case as authority for the proposition that a
principal is bound by the acts of his agent within the scope of an
agent's authority even when there is a provision limiting the authority,
if the person dealing with the agent is ignorant of the limitation. It
was noted that Russell had never been overruled and the majority was
criticized for having strayed from its rationale. Connecticut Fire In-
surance Company v. Roberts'00 (which the dissent described as one of
the leading cases which set the stage for "this fiasco"' 1 ) was dis-
tinguished since the conduct there had occurred at the inception of the
contract, when the application was being taken. In Roberts the insured
had claimed that the agent waived a policy clause prohibiting the
purchase of additional insurance. The Court upheld the defense of the
company that the agent did not have authority to make such a waiver,
since the insured had notice of the limitations on his authority. The
dissenters in Combs pointed out that there was an existing policy in
the hands of the insured which provided that the agent could not
waive requirements, and this factor in Roberts made it unlike the situa-
tion in which the agent fills in answers on the application under cir-
cumstances in which the insured has no notice of limitations on the
agent's authority.10 2 The rule followed by the Court in the Combs case
was criticized as being impractical and undesirable and "conceived in
mistake." 03
For these reasons I would overrule it, but even beyond this, it
penalizes the poor, aged, ignorant and unlettered. Invariably the highly
trained soliciting agent of the company seeks these people out and in
96 Id. at 959.
07 432 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1968).
98 Id. at 417.
09 Standard Auto Ins. Ass'n v. Russell, 199 Ky. 470, 251 S.W. 628 (1923).
100 226 Ky. 534, 11 S.W.2d 148 (1928).
101432 S.W.2d at 419.
10 2 Id. n. 1.
103 Id. at 422.
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order to procure a commission for himself takes their money while the
company issues a worthless policy. To me, this is the cruelest type of
injustice.... If either party must suffer from an insurance agent's mis-
takes, and wrong-doings, it must be his principal, the insurance company,
who hired him in the first instance and has the right to fire him in the
last.104
C. McReynolds-The Beginning
of a New Trend
In March of 1969 the Court of Appeals decided a case which, be-
cause it follows close on the heels of prior cases imposing a strict duty
to read on the applicant, will surprise those watching trends in the
field of insurance. In Pennsylvania Life Insurance Company v. Mc
Reynolds,10 5 the insured had been approached by the soliciting agent
of an insurance company who was in the midst of a sales contest. As
the application for a health and accident insurance policy was being
filled out, the agent asked if McReynolds had high blood pressure.
He replied, "Not to amount to anything." The agent then inquired
whether it went up very high or up to 200 or something like that and
Mcleynolds said, "No." McReynolds told the agent he had diabetes
in a mild form and that he controlled it by taking some tablets and
watching his diet. The agent told the applicant he would put "no" to
the question "Do you have diabetes?". The company issued the policy,
and a month later McReynolds suffered a stroke and tried to recover
on the policy. The defense of the insurance company was that the
insured had falsely represented that he had never had heart disease,
high blood pressure or diabetes.
In deciding McReynolds, the Court did not feel it was bound by
its previous decisions in Roberts, Tannenbaum and Mills, all of which
involved situations where the application form contained notice of
limitations on the authority of the company's soliciting agent. In Mc-
Reynolds, there was no such notice in the application.
It is highly possible that the Court's ruling may be extended in the
future to situations in which the application form does contain a notice
of limitations on the agent's authority. This reversal in attitude might
be expected to result from the Court's recognition that insurance con-
tracts are unique in nature. They are not contracts of bargaining, but
of adhesion. The insured seldom reads the policy prepared by the
insurer, but rather buys protection as he would any other commodity,
assuming it is what he ordered. "For the courts to say that the insured
104 Id. at 422 (dissenting opinion of Osborne, J.).
105 No. 69-188 (Ky. Court of Appeals, Mar. 28, 1969).
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is presumed to know the contents of the application and the policy is
to set up a presumption simply contrary to fact."10 6
When courts held that many of the limitations contained in policies
could have no effect as to transactions prior to the delivery of the
policy (such as conduct at the time of the application), insurers
reacted by inserting limitations in the application form, thereby
making the signed application, rather than just the policy, the terms of
the offer. Verdicts in Kentucky courts reflected the success of the new
maneuver by the insurance companies. However, the applicant con-
tinued to rely on the agent; and he was little more likely to read the
limitations in the application form than those contained in the policy
itself.
The Court observed in McReynolds that there was a problem of
balancing the need to protect insurers from material misrepresenta-
tions against the need to protect honest citizens "from the evil incidents
of sales methods which emphasize commissions for the soliciting agent
at the expense of the welfare of the interested applicant."10 7 The prob-
lem was thought to be particularly acute in cases involving non-
medical health and accident insurance, where the carrier had the right
to require a medical examination of the applicant before issuing a
policy, but waived it. This was the situation in McReynolds. On the
signed application, the insured had authorized the carrier to procure
his medical record from his physician. If the company had exercised
this right, it would have discovered that McReynolds' physician had
prescribed medication for his mild-to-moderate diabetes but had never
given him insulin until after the stroke. It would also have discovered
that at several times preceding the application he had an above-
normal blood pressure.
"In order to effect a better balance between the interests and
responsibilities of the carrier and the applicant in the field of non-
medical health and accident insurance," the Court held that it would
no longer place "fill responsibility," as stated in Combs, on the ap-
plicant to see that the application is correctly filled out unless the ap-
plicant himself, or his agent, has inserted the answers on the ap-
plication form. 08 The use of the clause "[W] e no longer will place full
responsibility" leaves unanswered exactly what duties and what degree
of responsibility the Court will impose upon the applicant for insurance
coverage. If the applicant knows false answers are being recorded, he
will be responsible for them, but his knowledge of the falsity may
106 Id. at p. 6 (majority opinion).
107 Id. at p. 7 (majority opinion).
108 Id. at pp. 7-8 (majority opinion).
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depend on his understanding as to exactly what information the
questions are seeking to elicit.
In McReynolds, the applicant had made full disclosure of his
diabetes and high blood pressure conditions to the agent who con-
sidered them too inconsequential to report. The Court stated that if
the applicant in good faith followed the implied assurance of the
agent that this information was not required, and was thereby misled
into believing his answers were truthful, then there had been no mis-
representation on his part. The summary judgment was reversed, and
the Court directed that the issue of good faith be tried.
The majority opinion was severely criticized in a dissenting opinion
which stated that the facts of the case brought it within the statute0 9
and the long-established rule. It was urged that a summary judgment
for the company should have been given on the basis of the insured's
testimony that he knew that the agent had put "No" to questions con-
cerning whether he had heart disease, high blood pressure, and
diabetes, when the correct answers should have been "Yes," Under
this view of the facts, the insured must have known that the agent was
inserting false answers, and the applicant should not be excused on
grounds that he did not fully understand what information the ques-
tions sought. The Court's sudden departure from precedent through
the overruling of a long line of decisions, two of which were still in
the advance sheets," 0 was criticized as creating an uncertainty and
instability in the law which was deplorable and frustrating. If the
statute and decisions were so wrong, the General Assembly could have
repealed or amended the statute. It was not the function of the courts
to do so."'
The dissent in McReynolds is undoubtedly correct in finding in
that decision a sudden and surprising departure from the holdings of
previous Kentucky cases. Nevertheless, it is a mere truism that every
new trend in legal thought must have a starting point. Whenever courts
have concluded that past cases were mired in an incorrect, unjust, or
unrealistic interpretation of law, it has been necessary for them to
depart from that interpretation and to overrule existing precedent in
the process. It will always be a problem in the common law courts to
balance the need for stability in the law with the need for flexibility
and incorporation into the law of new concepts of justice.
Though McReynolds was limited in its holding to the non-medical
109 Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.656 (1962).
1 v. Lincoln Income Life Ins. Co., 433 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1968);
Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Combs, 432 S.W.2d 415 (1968).
"'l No. 69-188 (Ky. Court of Appeals, Mar. 28, 1969) (dissenting opinion of
Montgomery, C.J.).
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health and accident insurance field, it would not be surprising if
future cases extended the new rule to other types of insurance. The
unique problems recognized by the Court of Appeals as existing in ad-
hesion contract situations do not arise solely in non-medical health
and accident policies. They occur in all types of standardized insurance
contract forms.
VII. CONCLUSION
Today, in many jurisdictions, the effects of the rule that an insurer
cannot avoid liability by a defense of material misrepresentation,
where the untrue answers were inserted by his agent without know-
ledge of the insured, are nullified in practice by the imposition on
purchasers of a duty to read their policies. The statutes enacted by
many states providing that the insurance application shall be attached
to the policy and thereby incorporated into the contract have aided
insurers in avoiding liability on such policies. By the use of careful
drafting, such as the inclusion of good health provisions and limita-
tions on the authority of agents, the insurer can secure an even moreL
favorable position.
In the field of non-medical health and accident insurance, Ken-
tucky no longer places the full responsibility on the applicant to see
that the application is correctly filled out. The Kentucky position may
be the more equitable one. It could be argued that of the two innocent
parties to the insurance contract, the insurer is the one best able to
remedy the evil. He selects the agents whom he hires and places them
in the position in which they are able to mislead applicants for insur-
ance into thinking that the company, with knowledge of the true facts
stated to its agent, has accepted the applicant as an insurance risk.112
The insurer should make an effort to ascertain that his employees are
competent and trustvorthy. If, after careful selection, he does obtain
a few who are careless or dishonest, then who is more able to anti-
cipate and provide against such a risk than the insurers, the people
whose daily business involves the anticipation of risks and provision
for contingencies? They are experienced in computing probability and
frequency of various occurrences, and are more able than the insured
to absorb and spread the risk."
3
Looking at the problem from the viewpoint of administration of the
legal system, however, holding the parties to the statements and pro-
112 Heake v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 15 N.J. 475, -, 105 A.2d 526, 530 (1954).
113 Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM
Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 V.AsN. L. REv. 1051, 1063
(1966).
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visions as they are written in the application and the polciy has de-
finite advantages. Courts prefer to have accurate, precise, and efficient
methods of fact-finding. If the contract is held to be the expression of
the representations and intentions of the parties, all the facts which
the court needs to decide the case are there in black and white. If,
however, the parties are allowed to bring in outside evidence, questions
will arise concerning statements made by the agent and the insured,
and the vague, abstract concept of the "good faith" of the insured
becomes an issue.'1 4 The court must also be concerned about the pos-
sibility of perjury in such a situation."05
Aside from administrative objectives, which are subordinate to con-
siderations of justice in the decision-making process, many courts feel
it is completely fair to bind the insured by the terms and statements
in the insurance contract which he has accepted. Such a rule is con-
sistent with general contract law, which imposes upon the party to
a contract the duty to read the instrument, and charges him with a
knowledge of its contents."0 It might be argued that the American
public, being better educated today than at any time in our nation's
history, should be capable of assuming such a responsibility. Many
courts feel insurance contracts should be treated no differently than
other binding agreements. It logically follows from this reasoning that
one who does not read his insurance contract is inexcusably negligent
and should be precluded from complaining about the untrue answers.
It has been questioned whether failure to read an insurance con-
tract is negligence." 7 Negligence has been defined as "the duty of
exercising ordinary care" or the use of that care "which a person of
ordinary prudence and caution would use." 118 Vance suggests that the
prevailing custom is for the insured to rely upon the "accuracy, skill,
and good faith" of the agent in filling out the application."" 9 And
as was pointed out in the dissenting opinion in Mills v. Reserve Life
Insurance Company: 20
... [E]ven the average man who can read and write, and who is
educated and experienced, is apt to trust the agent from whom he pur-
"14 See Id. at 1065.
115 See Id.
l1 American Fidelity Co. v. Mahoney, 174 A.2d 446, 449 (Me. 1961);
Bearden v. Countryside Cas. Co., 352 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Mo. 1961); Metzger v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 227 N.Y. 411, 416; 125 N.E. 814, 816 (1920).
117 W. VANCE, supra note 5, § 44, at 258-59.
118 The Nitroglycerine Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 524 (1872); Lucchese v.
San Francisco-Sacramento R.R., 106 Cal. App. 242, 289 P. 188 (1930); Brunel v.
Nashua Bldg. & Loan Assn, 95 N.H. 391, 64 A.2d 315 (1949).
"19 W. VANCE supra note 5, § 44, at 259-260.
120 335 S.W.2d 955 (1960).
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chases an insurance policy to the extent that he permits the agent to
fill out the application and then signs without reading it.'=t
Can failure to read an insurance policy be called negligent behavior
when the average man does not do so? Courts which recognize the
principle that customary practice is not ordinary care but only evidence
of ordinary care= 2 may say "yes" if the evidence of customary practice
merely demonstrates that large numbers of persons are conducting
themselves in a careless manner.
Future decisions in cases in which false answers were inserted in
an application by an insurance agent may be influenced by the
development of principles of law in the field of adhesion contracts
generally. The issue to be decided may be phrased:
To what extent should a person be charged with knowledge of, and be
bound by, the contents of a standardized contract form, when that
person is the party in the weaker bargaining position and does not have
an adequate opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract?
By its decision in McReynolds, Kentucky has placed itself among those
states recognizing that insurance contracts are of a distinct nature and
should be treated in a different manner than other commercial con-
tracts.
Kay K. Alley
121 Id. at 959 (dissenting opinion of Palmore, J.).
122 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir.
1955).
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